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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MILITARY LAW-TRIAL OF MILITARY
DEPENDENTS OVERSEAS BY COURT-MARTIAL IN CAPITAL CASES
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-A military court-martial, taking juris-

diction under Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,1
convicted civilian dependents for the murders of their husbands overseas. On a rehearing of consolidated habeas corpus proceedings, the
United States Supreme Court reversed its previous decision and held
that the trial by court-martial in capital cases in times of peace of
dependent-wives accompanying their soldier-husbands overseas is unconstitutional. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
It seems well established that a sovereign has jurisdiction over
all persons within its borders.2 However, by a series of treaties with
numerous foreign countries, most of which are members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States has acquired primary jurisdiction over civilian dependents accompanying the armed
forces overseas.3
Article 2(11) is an outgrowth of Article 2(d) of the Articles of
War passed by Congress in 1916. 4 The instant cases mark the first
time the Supreme Court passed upon the constitutionality of this
provision. 5 Its validity had previously been upheld by lower federal
7
courts 6 and the United States Court of Military Appeals.

On the first hearing of the cases, the majority of the Court8 did
not consider the often repeated rule that the power of Congress to
establish "legislative" courts,9 such as military courts-martial, must
be related to some pertinent enumerated power. These "legislative"
tribunals have been upheld as valid exercises of the congressional
power to govern territories; 10 to regulate foreign commerce; 11 and
to implement treaties.12 In every case, the Supreme Court examined
the appropriateness of a "legislative" court in relation to the exercise
of a particular power. Therefore, it would seem that the Court was
incorrect in predicating its decision on an isolated power to create
164 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 552(11) (1952).
2KijnselIa v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 479 (1956).
3 See, e.g., Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S. TREATIEs
& OTHER INT'L AGREEmENTS 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 492 (effective April 28, 1952) ;

North Atlantic Treaty Status of the Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.

TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (effective Aug.

23, 1953).
4
Articles of War, 1916, 39 STAT. 651.
5 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3 (1957).
6 See, e.g., Mobley v. Handy, 176 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1949); Ex parte
Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
7 See United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956).
8 Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956) ; Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470
(1956).
9 E parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
10 American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 685 (1828).
11 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., .-upra note 9, at 458.
12 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
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"legislative" courts, without considering the question whether an
enumerated power existed for which their creation may be necessary
and proper.
On the second hearing, the majority opinion, 13 written by Justice Black, recognized that the Constitution grants Congress power
to make all rules ". . . necessary and proper . . ." to govern and
regulate those persons who are serving in the "...
land and naval
Forces. . .. , 14 Under this majority view, however, the "necessary
and proper" clause cannot operate to extend jurisdiction to any group
of persons beyond that class described in clause 14-the land and
naval forces.15
Justice Harlan, concurring, as well as the two dissenting justices, appear to agree with Justice Frankfurter that ". . . 'it is a
constitution we are expounding.' "16 Therefore, all the provisions
of the Constitution must be read together. For them the question is
whether civilian dependents are so closely related to what Congress
may allowably deem essential for the effective regulation of the armed
services that they may be subjected to courts-martial jurisdiction in
these capital cases, when the consequence is loss not only of the protections afforded by Article III of the Constitution, but also the
fifth and sixth amendments. They differed17 as to how closely dependents were related to military operations.
The dissenting justices contended that two policy considerations
justified congressional power to enact Article 2(11) : the network of
ties binding the civilian to an identifiable military community- and
the necessity of maintaining order and discipline among such civilians
to prevent any impairment of the military mission.' 8 These arguments, however, seem to avoid the question as to what is the appropriate method of maintaining order in military camps.
13 Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred in
the opinion of Justice Black. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in
separate opinions, while Justice Clark dissented in an opinion in which Justice
Burton joined.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
IsReid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1957). However, Justice Black
realizes that some civilians might be construed to be part of the armed services
for purposes of clause 14. Id. at 23.
16 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 43 (1957) (concurring opinion), citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 422 (1819).
17 The Supreme Court would apparently draw a distinction between civilians
having functional connections with the military and those having merely social
ties. The former would include employees on whom rested an affirmative
duty of contributing to the military operation. Civilian dependents would be
considered as having merely social ties. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22-23

(1957).

1s ,..
[Tihe inability of the military authorities to deal decisively with
the conduct of camp followers, and other 'accompanying' persons . . . might
adversely affect military operations and morale. . . . However, the service
concerned cannot successfully deter such depredations by persons as to whom
it lacks power to punish." United States v. Garcia, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 100,

17 C.M.R. 88, 100 (1954).
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While Justice Black's opinion indicates that courts-martial of
civilian dependents for all crimes is unconstitutional, 19 Justice Frankfurter strictly limits himself to the facts of the case. He did state,
though, that "the taking of life is irrevocable" 20 and that:
It is in capital cases especially that the balance of conflicting interests must
be weighted most heavily in favor of the procedural safeguards of the Bill
2
of Rights. 1

on the narrow ground that
Justice Harlan specifically concurs "...
where the offense is capital, Article 2(11) cannot constitutionally be
applied to the trial of civilian dependents." 22 He argues:
In such cases the law is especially sensitive to demands for that procedural

fairness which inheres in a civilian trial where the judge and trier of fact are
not responsive to the command of the convening authority. 23

The instant case poses a difficult question: how to try militaryconnected civilians accused of crimes in foreign lands. To suspend
completely the practice of allowing dependents to accompany military
forces abroad would undoubtedly be bad for military morale. Yet
it is imperative that a solution be found to the problem raised by
the Court's decision in order that there will be no "crime without
Among the possible solutions are: constitutional
punishment."
amendment; trial of such civilians by the foreign jurisdiction, as is
the case with American tourists; trial of such civilians in the United
States; or the establishment of civilian courts overseas.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY - FAILURE TO
ANSwER JURYMEN'S QUESTION HELD NOT NECESSARILY REVERSIBLE

ERRoR.-Defendant was convicted on counts of kidnapping and felony
murder. Although his sole defense was insanity, the trial judge
failed to answer the jury's question as to whether they must find for
defendant if they believed him to have been insane part of the time
during the commission of the crime. Section 427 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure provides that information on a point of
law desired by the jury must be given in open court.1 The Court
29 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957).
2oId. at 45 (concurring opinion).
21
Id.at 45-46 (concurring opinion).
22
Id.at 65 (concurring opinion).
23
Id. at 77 (concurring opinion).
1 "After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be a disagreement

between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed
of a point of law arising in the cause, they must require the officer to conduct

